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[Crlm. No. 5485. In Bank. Dec. 22, 1953.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIE DELONEY,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide - Appeal- Modification of Jud.gment.-Although
jury in a homicide case could have concluded from evidence
that the killing was committed in a brawl on sudden impulse
when defplldant's emotions were aroused and his inhibitions
removed by alcohol and thus have returned a verdict of lower
degree of homicide than flrst degree murder, the Supreme
Court cannot reduce offense to a lower degree of homicide if
jury could also have concluded from evidence that the ldlling
was result of delib~ration and premeditation.
[i] Id.-Evidence-DeHberation and Premeditation.-Where there
was evidence in a homicide ease that defendant intervened
in a quarrel between deceased and another man and stated to
the latter, ''If I had your gun, if I was you, I would have
killed him," thereby indicating that there was then animosity
between defendant and deceased, and where, after withdrawing from a tlst tight with deceased, defendant procured such
gun from the other man and, regardless of consequences and
despite warnings and efforts of his friends, was determined
to kill deceased and, in the ensuing tight, after both defendant
and deceased were disarmed, defendant seized gun at first
opportunity and twice shot his victim, and thereafter, when
his opponent was helpless on the ground, defendant emptied
McIt. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 273; [2] Homicide, § 158;
{S) Homicide, § 179(5); [4,9] Homicide, § 268; [5] Criminal Law,
1691; [6] Homicide, §141; [7,10) Homicide, 1229(1); [8] Bomieide, 1142; [11] Homicide, § 22·2; [12] Homicide, 1261.
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gun into victim's body, telling spectators and deceased's wife
that he had intended to kill deceased and had carried out
that intention, the Supreme Court cannot say that jury could
not reasonably conclude that killing was result of deliberation
and premeditation.
[8] ld. - Instructions - Deliberation and Premeditation.-An instruction in a homicide case that "a man may do a thing
wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a moment's reSection as well as after pondering over the subject for a
month or years," and "He can premeditate, that is, think
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose,
as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or
preparation," unduly emphasized that there need be little
time to form intent to kill or little time between formation
of intent to kill and execution thereof, and may have misled
jury in concluding that though the killing was hasty and
hurried, impUlsive and unstudied, it was nevertheless first
degree murder.
[4] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.Error in an instruction in a homicide case that a man may
do a thing deliberately and intentionally from a moment's
rellection was not cured by another instruction correctly defining the deliberation and premeditation required to establish
first degree murder, sinee this created an irreconcilable con1lict
between the instructions, ..nd Supreme Court cannot speculate
which of them the jury followed.
[5] Criminal Law-Instnictions - Cautiona17 Instructions..;.. Admissions.-ln a homicide ease, trial court should give an iDstruction on its own motion that admissions of defendant &l'8
to be viewed with caution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4.)
[6] Homicide-Burden of Proof.-lil a homicide ease, bUrden
is on the People to prove defendant guilty of first degree
murder beyond a tea.'1onable doubt.
[7] ld.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-An instruction in language of Pen. Code, § n05, concerning defendant's
. burden of proving mitigating circumstances when commission
of homicide by him is shown, without advising jury that such
instruction would have no application. in determining degree
of murder and that it could apply only in determining whether
homicide was murder or manslaughter, or was excusable O!

[3] See Cal.Jur.. Homicide, 114 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
1142,536.
[5] See Oal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 359; Am.Jur., Trial, § 6U
. et seq.
[7] See Oal.Jur.. Homicide, 1103 et seq. j Am.Jur., Homicide,
1285 et seq.
Q c.Jd-.ll
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justifiable, was error, particularly where one of most difficult
questions before jury was whether homicide was first degree
murder, second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.
[8] ld.-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-Pen. Code, § 1105, does
not place on defendant the burden of persuasion, but merely
declares a rule of procedure that imposes on him a duty of
going forward with evidence of mitigating circumstances.
[9] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.Error in instructing jury in language of Pen. Code, § 1105,
was not cured by additional statements that proof of circumstances of mitigation need not be by a preponderance of
evidence, but only to extent sufficient to raise reasonable doubt
in .mnds of jurors as to defendant's guilt or mitigating circumstances, they not having been expressly told that prosecution has burden throughout trial to prove every element of
crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that burden of persuasion
never shifts to defendant.
[10] :tri.-Instructions - Burden of Proof - Mitigation.-An instruction in language of Pen. Code, § 1105, even with an adequate explanation of its meaning, has no proper place in
charge to jury.
[11] ld.-Instructions-Self-defense.-ln a homicide case, it was
proper to give instructions that right of self-defense exists
only as against an unlawful attack, that one attacked by
assault with fists is not justified in using a deadly weapon if
assault is not likely to produce great bodily injury, and that
the law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit
an assault to design in advance his own defense by instigating
a quarrel, where each instruction was justified by the evidence.
[12] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.
-In a homicide case, errors in an instruction on premeditation
and deliberation and in an instruction in language of Pen. Code,
§ 1105, which failed to advise jury that it had no application
in its determination of degree of murder, and in failing to
give cautionary instruction with regard to admissions of defendant as required by Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4, required reversal of judgment of conviction of first degree
murder to avoid a miscarriage of justice, where it was not improbable that a correctly instructed jury would have reached
a different verdict, and where the evidence, though sufficient
to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, would readily
justify a conviction of a lesser degree of homicide.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239b)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County,
and from an order denying a new trial. B. C. Hawkins,
Judge. Reversed.
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of 'first
degree murder imposing death penalty, Teversed.
Rodin, Nelson & Coffin and Robert R. Coffin fOT Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant Willie Deloney was charged
by information with the murder of Ollie Stillwell. He pleaded
not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the
first degree without recommendation. Defendant's motion
for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to death.
The appeal to this court is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239b.)
The killing occurred at about 8 :20 p. m. on February 15,
1953, at Bob's Barbecue, a cafe and bar located in the Monte
Vista Tract on Crow's Landing Road, Stanislaus County.
Defendant had been in the bar most of the day drinking beer.
Stillwell and his wife, Willie Stillwell, had spent the afternoon
in Stockton with Golie Turner and Willie Crawford and had
had several drinks. They returned in Turner's car, after
stopping for a short time at Modesto. Turner left the Stillwells at their home, a block or two from the bar. Turner and
Crawford continued on to the bar. Defendant was dancing
by himself on the dance Hoor and playing the juke box and
piano. About 8 p. m. Stillwell and his wife came to the bar.
Bill Allen, known as Cowboy, asked Stillwell to buy him
a drink. Stillwell's refusal led to an argument. Willie
Stillwell took her husband by the colJar and dragged him
outside. Crawford tried to persuade Stillwell to go home.
Cowboy and defendant came out, and Cowboy and Stillwell
resumed their argument. Cowboy had a .22 caliber pistol
in his belt, but made no attempt to use it. , Cowboy and Stillwell scufBed for a few minutes and then Cowboy entered the
bar.
As he passed through the doorway defendant said to him,
"If I had your gun, if I was you, I would have killed him."
Stillwell overheard this remark. A fist fight followed between
the two, aud Stillwell knocked defendant down two or three
times. Calvin Belford, known as Roger, joined the fight and
seized Stillwell from behind and threw him to the ground.
Roger was forced to let go his grip when Willie Stillwell bit
him in the back. Defendant got to his feet and returned
with Cowboy to the baT. Stillwell and his wife remained out-
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side. Defendant and Cowboy went to the back part of the
bar. Defendant asked for the gun, and Cowboy gave it to
him. Defendant started for the door, waving the gun, when one
of the other patrons seized him and threw him to the floor, saying, "Willie, you're not to get in no trouble like that." Defendant tried to get up, shouting, "Turn me loose, I'll kill
him." The bartender, not realizing that defendant had the
gun, told the men to let him go, and they released· him.
One of the men shouted, "Stillwell, Deloney got a pistol.
You better start running if you're going to run. If you stay,
you're going to fight him." Stillwell went to his car, took
off his overcoat, folded it, placed it in his car, took a tire pump
from the turtle back, and then rolled up his sleeves. He returned to the side of the building near the door and by a
window where he could see inside the bar. Defendant paused
at the door with the gun in his hand by his side and was
pushed by a man behind him that two of the witnesses identified as Cowboy. As defendant passed through the doorway,
Stillwell struck him on the side of the head with the tire
pump. Defendant dropped the gun and fell to the ground
near a parked car. Stillwell attempted to strike him a second
time, but the tire pump hit the side of t.be car and was knocked
from his hands. Stillwell leaped upon defendant and struck
him repeatedly in the face with his bands. Stillwell made
no attempt to pick up the gun.
As the two men rolled on the ground, defendant managed
to regain the gun with his right hand. Stillwell seized defendant's right hand with his own left hand and continued
to strike defendant in the face with his right hand. Defendant
was still on the ground with Stillwell crouching over him,
when defendant fired one shot into the ground and then
twisted the gun around and fired two shots into Stillwell's
body. Stillwell fell to the ground. Defendant got to his
feet and walked to the door of the bar. He said to the spectators, "I told you guys I was going to kill him." He turned
back, stood over Stillwell, who had not moved since the first
shots, and said, "I told you I was going to kill you." He then
fired the gun into Stillwell's body until the gun clicked several times on empty chambers. Stillwell's wife, who had
been holding RQger from the fight, came running to the scene
and asked defendant if he had killed Stillwell. Defendant
said, "Yes I killed him. I told you I was going to kill him,
so I killed him." Defendant returned to the bar and waited
for the officers. Defendant and Stillwell had known each
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other before the shooting, but there is no evidence of any
previous animosity between them.
The foregoing evidence was presented by the People. The
defense rested at the close of the People's case.
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. On the record the
killing could come within the statutory definition of first
degree murder only on the ground that it was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defendant urges
that the killing was done in anger without deliberation and
premeditation. He points to the evidence that he had been
drinking, that there was no previous animosity between him
and Stillwell, that he did not arm himself until after a fist
fight with Stillwell, and that he did not fire the fatal shots
until after he had been repeatedly struck on the head and face
by his victim. He contends that there is no evidence of any
motive that might indicate deliberation or premeditation, that
the killing was committed in a brawl on sudden impulse when
his emotions were aroused and his inhibitions removed by
alcohol and the blows he had received, that considering the
character of the affray, either of the principals might have
been killed, and that it was a fortuitous circumstance that
it was Stillwell and not the defendant.
[1] The jury could certainly have drawn the foregoing
conclusions from the evidence and returned a verdict of a
lower degree of homicide than first degree murder. (People
v. Tubby, 34 Ca1.2d 72, 77-78 [207 P.2d 51] ; People v. Bender,
27 Ca1.2d 164, 178-180 [163 P.2d 8) '; People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d
59, 92-93 [153 P.2d 21J ; People v. Fields, 99 Cal.App.2d 10,
13-14 [221 P.2d 190] ; People v. Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622,
635 [151 P.2d 275].) We cannot reduce the offense to a
lesser degree of homicide, however, if the jury couId also
conclude from the evidence that the killing was not on sudden
impulse in the heat of passion when defendant's inhibitions
were removed, but was the result of deliberation and premeditation. [2] There was ample time in the interval between defendant's intervention in the quarrel between Cowboy and Stillwell and the firing of the fatal shots for defendant
to contemplate the killing of Stillwell and to weigh and consider the consequences. The crucial question is whether the
jury could find that he did so or was bound to conclude that
during that time defendant's emotions were so aroused and
his acts and statements so rash and impetuous that there was
no reflection or weighing of considerations either before or
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after the intent to kill was formed. Defendant's intervention
in the quarrel between Cowboy and Stillwell and his statement to Cowboy at that time, "If I had your gun, if I was
you, I would have killed him," indicates that there was then
animosity between defendant and Stillwell and that defendant
was not only not adverse to killing Stillwell but thought that
Cowboy should have done so. After withdrawing from his
:fist fight with Stillwell, defendant entered the bar to get the
gun. His friends attempted to persuade him to remain in
the bar and not to .. get in no trouble like that. "Thus, regardless of consequences and despite the warnings and efforts
of his friends, defendant was determined to kill Stillwell. In
the ensuing fight outside, after both defendant and Stillwell
were disarmed, defendant seized the gun at the first opportunity and twice shot his victim. When his opponent was
helpless on the ground, either unconscious or dead. and all
danger to defendant was past, he emptied the gun into his
body. He told the spectators and Stillwell's wife that he had
intended to kill Stillwell and had carried out that intention.
In the light of this evidence, we cannot say that the jury could
not reasonably conclude that the killing was the l'esult of
deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Gilliam, 39 Cal.
2d 235, 239 [246 P.2d 31] ; People v. Hooper, 35 Cal.2d 165,
168 [216 P.2d 876] ; Peop1,e v. Is'by. 30 Cal.2d 879. 888-890
[186 P.2d 405].)
[3] Defendant contends that the instruction on deliberation and premeditation was prejudicially erroneous. The
court gave the following instruction: "You are instructed that
a man may do a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally
from a moment's reflection as well as after pondering over
the subject for a month or years. He can premeditate, that
is think before doing the act, the moment he conceives the
purpose, as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or preparation. There is nothing in the sections of
the Penal Code which relate to this subject, which indicate
that the Legislature meant to assign any particular period
to this process of deliberation or premeditation, in order to
bring the act within the first degree."
This court has repeatedly condemned similar instructions
on the ground that they lead the jury to believe that neither
deliberation nor premeditation, in the commonly understood
meaning of those terms, need be proved by the People.
(People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 777-778 [228 P.2d 281] ;
Peop1,e v. Cornett, 33 Cal.2d 33, 40-42 [198 P.2d 877]; People
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v. Honeycutt, 29 Ca1.2d 52, 60-61 [172 P.2d 698] ; People v.
Valentine, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 134 [169 P.2d 1] ; People v. Bender,
27 Ca1.2d 164, 182-183 [163 P.2d 8) ; People v. Thomas, 25
Ca1.2d 880, 900-901 [156 P.2d 7).)
Th@ instruction has the same vices as the one given in
People v. Bender, supra. The statements that, u a man may
do a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a
moment's reflection as well as after pondering over the subject for a month or years," and "He can premeditate, that is,
think before doing the act,the moment he conceives the
purpose, as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or preparation," are word-for-word the same as the
instruction condemned in the Bender case. (27 Ca1.2d at 182.)
The instruction unduly emphasizes that there need be little
time to form the intent to kill or little time between the
formation of the intent to kill and the execution thereof, and
may have misled the jury ,. into thinking that an act can at
the same time be hasty, hurried, and deliberate, or impUlsive,
unstudied, and premeditated." (People v. Bender, supra,
27 Ca1.2d at 185.)
[4J Another instruction stated: "[B)efore you can bring
back a verdict of murder in the first degree, you must find that
the killing was accompanied and was preceded by a clear, deliberate intent to take life; an intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which must be the result of deliberation and
premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon a preexisting reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion
or other condition such as precludes the idea of deliberation.
To be murder in the first degree you must find that at the
moment WILLIE DELONEY fired the shot which was fatal to
OLLIE STILLWELL that he had a clear deliberate intention to
take the life of OLLIE STILLWELL, and you must further find
that this deliberate and clear intention to take the life of
OLLIE STILLWELL had been formed upon a pre-existing reflection and that at the time that the defendant fired the fatal
shot that he was not acting under the sudden heat of passion,
or as to any other condition which precludes the idea of deliberation. "
Since the foregoing instruction is a correct statement of the
law (People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 901-902 [256 P.2d
911]), the People contend that any error in the first instruction was cured. It is obvious, however, that there is an irreconcilable conflict in the instructions, and we are not at
liberty to speculate as to which of them the jury followed.
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(People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 778; People v.
Cornett supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, 41; People v. Honeycutt, supra,
.29 Ca1.2d 52, 62; People v. Dail, 22 Ca1.2d 642, 653 [140
P.2d 828].)
As we ha\'e observed above, there is ample evidence that
would justify the jury's concluding that the homicide was
not deliberate and premeditated and was therefore not murder of the first degree. Under the first instruction, however,
the jury may have concluded that even though the killing
was hasty and hurried, impUlsive and unstudied, it would
nevertheless be first degree murder. If the jury followed this
instruction, it may have found the existence of facts showing
no more than second degree murder and yet returned a verdict
of first degree murder.
[5] The trial court did not instruct the jury that admissions of defendant were to be viewed with caution. Section 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides th3t
the jury is "to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions . . . that the testimony of an accomplice ought til
be viewed with distrust, and the evidence of the oral admissions of a party with caution." The court should have
given such an instruction on its own motion. (People Y,
Bemis. 33 Ca1.2d 395, 398-399 [202 P.2d 82);· People Y.
Hamilton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873] ; People Y. Cornett,
33 Ca1.2d 33,40 [198 P.2d 877) ; People v. Koenig. 29 Ca1.2d
87.94 [173 P.2d 1).)
Defendant's alleged statement to Mrs. Stillwell after the
shooting, "I told you I was going to kill him, so I killed
him. " and his statement to the spectators, "I told you guys
I was going to kill him," were key parts of the People's
proof of premeditation and deliberation. [6] The burden
was on the People to prove defendant guilty of first degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining whether
that burden had been met, a difficult question on the facts of
the present case, the jury should have been given the instruction required by section 2061 (4). Defendant's admissions
were vitally important evidence in this case; it was likewise
vitally important that the jury be guided as to the manner
in which it was to view that evidence.
['1] The jury was instructed that, "Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide by the defendant being
proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation,
or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon him, unless the
proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show that the
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crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the
defendant was justifiable or excusable. But sucb proof need
not be by a preponderance of tbe evidence, but only to an
extent sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jurors as to his guilt or the mitigating circumstances. You
are further instructed that where, as in this case, tbe defendant
bas produced no evidence in his own behalf, he may have the
benefit, in determining the matters expressed in this instruc·
tion, of the evidence produced by the prosecution if and
when it is to his advantage to do so." The first. part of this
instruction was in the language of section 1105 of the Penal
Code.
This court has held repeatedly that a jury should not be
instructed in the language of section 1105. (People v. Letourneau" 34 Cal.2d 478, 490-491 [211 P.2d 865]; People v.
Cornett, 33 Cal.2d 33, 42-44 [198 P.2d 877] ; People v. Valen.
tine, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 132-134 [169 P.2d 1] ; People v. Thomas,
25 Cal.2d 880, 895-896 [156 P.2d 7].) The jurY was not
advised that such an instruction would have no application
in determining the degree of murder and that it could apply
only .in determining whether the homicide was murder or
manslaughter, or was excusable or justifiable. (People v.
Thomas, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 897.) The words "circumstances of mitigation tt may have been interpreted by the jury
to include circumstances that reduce the homicide from murder
in the first degree to murder in the second degree. The error
was particularly serious in the present case, since one of tbe
most difficult questions before the .jury was whether the homicide was first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaugbter. As we recently pointed out, such an
instruction "may have the effect of foreclosing any considera·
. tion by the jury that mitigating circumstances, althougb not
sufficient in law to justify or excuse the homicide, may be
. enough to reduce the crime to second degree murder by coun: teracting the element of premeditation and deliberation."
(People v. Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, 43.)
[8] Section 1105 does not place on a defendant the burden of persuasion, but merely declares a rule of procedure
that imposes on him a duty of going forward with evidence
of mitigating circumstances. (People v. Cornett, supra, 33
Cal.2d 33, 42; see 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 405.) If the jurY is instructed in the words of the statute alone, it may be misled
into construing the "burden of proving circumstances of mitigation" as imposing llpon the defendant the burden of persua-
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sion and into believing that mitigating circumstances do not
exist unless the defendant proves the existence of such circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. (See People v.
Oornett, supra, 33Ca1.2d at 42-43.) [9] 'l'he trial court
in the present case attempted to meet this objection by adding,
"but such proof need not be by a preponderance of the evidence, but only to an extent sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jurors as to his guilt or the mitigating circumstances" and by explaining that defendant could
take advantage of evidence produced by the prosecution. These
additional statements may have avoided some of the confusion
that would result from a reading of section 1105 alone (People
v. Leddy, 95 Cal.App. 659, 672 [273 P. 110] ; see People v.
Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at 44), although the jury should have
been expressly told in connection with the instruction on section 1105, that the prosecution has the burden throughout
the trial to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that the burden of persuasion never shifts to
the defendant. [10] In any event, an instruction in the language of section 1105, even with an adequate explanation of its
meaning, has no proper place in a charge to the jury. As we
stated in Poople v. Thomas, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, "logic suggests that since such section in reality merely declares a rule
of procedure and does not relieve the state of the burden of
proving each and every essential element of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt the propriety of reading it to the jury, even
with a proper explanation, is doubtful." (25 Cal.2d at 896;
see, also, discussion in California Jury Instructions Criminal
[1946], p. 283.)
[11] Defendant contends that three instructions· on the
right of self-defense should not have been given. He does not
contend that the instructions were incorrectly worded, but
invokes the rule that it is error to give instructions on prin·"The right of self-defense exists only as against an unlawful attack.
The right does not exist, even though bodily injury appears probable,
88 against a person who, in threatening or appearing to threaten injury,
is acting lawfully." (People's Instruction No. 23.)
, 'If an assault with the :lists is being made on a person, but without
intent to kill or to do great bodily harm, and if the assault is not likely
to produce great bodily injury, and if the one thus attacked is Dot deceived as to the character of such an assault, he is not justified in using
a deadly weapon in self-defense." (People's Instruction No. 25.)
, 'The law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit an
assault upon another to design in advance his own defense by instigating
a quarrel or a combat with a view thereby to create a situation wherein
the infliction of the intended injury will appear to have been dODe in
.elf-defense." (People'. Instruction No. 26.)
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ciples of law that have no application to the facts of a case.
(People v. Sanchez, 30 Ca1.2d 560, 572 [184 P.2d 673] ; People
Y. Silver, 16 Ca1.2d 714, 722 [108 P.2d 4] ; People v. Roe, 189
Cal. 548, 558 [209 P. 560] ; People v. Geibel, 93 Cal.App.2d
147, 178 [208 P.2d 743].)
From a review of the record it appears that each instruction was properly given. Instruction No. 23 was justified
by the evidence. In view of defendant's statement to Cowboy, in the presence of Stillwell, that had he been Cowboy
he would have killed Stillwell, and his statement in the bar,
"Turn me loose, I'll kill him,t' it could be inferred that
defendant came out of the bar to kill Stillwell, that Stillwell
knew it, and that he acted lawfully when he seized the tire
pump and struck defendant. Instruction No. 25 was also
justified by the evidence. At the time defendant fired the
fatal shots, Stillwell had dropped the tire pump and had
made no attempt either to retrieve it or pick up the gun.
Instruction No. 26 was likewise proper; the jury could infer
from the evidence that defendant was the aggressor throughout.
CONCLUSION

[12] Three serious errors were committed at the trial of
this case: (I) The instruction on premeditation and deliberation was erroneous; (2) The instruction in the language of
section 1105 of the Penal Code failed to advise the jury that
it had no application in its determination of the degree of
murder; and (3) The jury was not. instructed as required
by section 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
A number of cases have held that such errors requiredreversal (People v. Carme11, 36 Ca1.2d 768 [228 P.2d 281] [error
(1), supra, combined with other errors] ; People v. Bemis, 33
Ca1.2d 395 [202 P.2d 82) [error (3)]; People v. Cornett, 33
CaI.2d 33 [198 P.2d 877) [errors (1), (2), and (3)]; People
v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 (169 P.2d 1] (errors (1) and (2)];
People v. Thom.as, 25 Ca1.2d 880 (156 P.2d .7] [errors (1)
and (2)]); in other cases, relied upon by the People, this
court has concluded that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that reversal was not indicated. (People v. Letourneau,34 Ca1.2d 478 [211 P.2d 865J [errors (2) and (3)];
People v. Hilton, 29 Cal.2d 217 [174 P.2d 5] [error (1)];
People tI. Keonig, 29 Cal.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1] [error (3)];
People Y. Honeycutt, 29 Ca1.2d 52 [172 P.2d 698] [error (1)];
People v. BerMrd,28 Cal.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636] [error (1)].)
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Each case necessarily turns on its own facts. A careful
examination of the entire record in this case leads to the conclusion that it is not improbable that a correctly instructed
jury would have reached a different verdict. The evidence,
although sufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, would readily justify a conviction of a lesser degree of
homicide. Each error in this case tended to lead the jury
to a verdict of first degree murder even though it may have
drawn inferences from the evidence showing no more than
second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. As in
People v. Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, where the errors were
identical with those in the present case, reversal is necessary
to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

